I provide a new proof of uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of global games. I show that the joint best-response in these games is a contraction. The uniqueness result then follows as a corollary of the contraction property. Furthermore, the contraction mapping approach provides a revealing intuition for why uniqueness arises: Complementarities in games generate multiplicity of equilibria, but the global games structure dampens complementarities so that only one equilibrium exists. I apply my result to show that uniqueness is obtained through contraction in currency crises and Diamond's search models.
ËÇ Á Ä Ë Á AE ÏÇÊÃÁAE È È Ê ½¾ ¿Ê 1 Introduction
Many economic situations present complementarities. If we think of strategies as real numbers, games with strategic complementarities (GSC) are games in which the marginal utility that an agent receives from playing a greater strategy, increases as other agents also play greater strategies. Beyond their intuitive interpretation, these games possess some nice properties in terms of existence of equilibria, characterization of the equilibrium set and comparative statics. However, complementarities often result in multiple equilibria (Takahashi [20] ), which requires a theory of equilibrium selection for GSC to have predictive power. Pioneering work by Carlsson and van Damme ( [3] , CvD hereafter) and Frankel, Morris and Pauzner ( [4] , FMP hereafter) has provided such a theory of equilibrium selection with the theory of Global Games. In global games, a unique profile survives iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Although global games are widely used in economics (Debt pricing (Morris and Shin [14] ), currency crises (Morris and Shin [13] ), bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner [5] ), merger waves (Toxvaerd [22] )), the proofs of uniqueness by CvD and FMP are intricate, and have left us with a limited understanding of the uniqueness result. My main contribution is to introduce contraction principles into global games to provide a more instructive and intuitively appealing proof of uniqueness.
My result takes a stronger or a weaker form, which depends on the assumptions placed on beliefs. Global games are games with incomplete information and players receive a noisy signal about a random payoff parameter. Conditional on their signal, players formulate beliefs about their opponents' signals. The stronger claim applies when these beliefs are well-behaved or when they satisfy a translation criterion discussed later. Consider the metric space (C, d) where C is the set of strategy profiles and d is a metric. Let br be the (joint) best-response in the global game. I prove the following contraction property
(CP): d(br(c), br(c )) < d(c, c ) for all (c, c ) ∈ C
2 with c = c . Since global games are GSC, Tarski's theorem applies to the best-response to show the existence of a fixed point (See Topkis [21] ). If the best-response had two fixed points, then (CP) would lead to a contradiction. Thus the equilibrium must be unique.
The weaker claim applies when there is no requirement on beliefs. Players receive noisy signals but the precision of their signal increases as some noise parameter ν vanishes. Parameterize the global game by its noise level and let br(ν) be the joint bestresponse in this game. Define C ν as the set of pairs (c, c ) for which br(ν ) satisfies (CP) for all ν < ν. Then, I prove that ∪ ν>0 C ν = C 2 . In words, the best-reply is a contraction in the limit because the set on which it contracts approaches the whole set as ν goes to zero. For every noise level, the global game is a GSC and thus an equilibrium exists. The contraction property then implies that the equilibrium must be unique in the limit as the noise disappears.
This contraction result provides a formal basis for the existing intuition that the global games structure lessens complementarities to the point where we obtain a unique equilibrium. GSC have a coordination-game "flavor" that leads to multiple equilibria; this relationship can be traced to how strong complementarities are. But, global games are GSC and there is a unique equilibrium in the limit. Therefore, the complementarities in global games must somehow be lessened as the noise level shrinks. This intuition is set out in Vives [25] , who establishes that complementarities are moderated in a specific example of a global game. My paper thereby provides the first result that formalizes how the global games structure dampens complementarities in a general global game framework. The positive slope of the best-reply is a measurement of the strength of complementarities; I show that the best-reply is a contraction, hence it is not "too increasing." Therefore the complementarities cannot be too strong which leads to uniqueness.
My results require two assumptions in addition to FMP's, but these assumptions are either automatically satisfied or unnecessary in 2 × 2 games.
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With some qualifications, the contraction result is, for 2 × 2 games, as general as the previous results of uniqueness in the literature. Those games are of interest because it is the class of games analyzed in the seminal work by CvD. These assumptions come into play in general finite games, but the structure is still general enough to allow for applications to well-known models like currency crises and Diamond's search. 2 In the currency crises model, one of these assumptions is trivially satisfied, and the other one is a natural property of the exchange rate. In the Diamond's search model, both assumptions are satisfied in the traditional setting with convex cost functions.
Moreover, the contraction mapping principle sharply leads to uniqueness; once it is established, uniqueness is transparent. FMP's uniqueness result is a significant generalization of the infection arguments of CvD, and it still relies on iterated strict dominance. With the contraction mapping, solving for iterated elimination of dominated strategies is obviated and FMP's (and thus CvD's) uniqueness result becomes a corollary of the contraction argument.
In addition, I argue in Section 2 that the contraction result is simpler to establish than the results in previous literature. The intuition for the proof of the contraction in the 2 × 2 case, which is presented in Section 4.1.1, is straightforward and easily carries over to the general case. However, the notation is somewhat heavy. Section 5 gives the intuition for this generalization.
Finally, FMP's result relies on a two-step argument where uniqueness in the actual bayesian game is shown from a simplified version of the same game. Uniqueness follows by continuity to this easier environment where uniqueness is more easily verified. This methodology is not fully informative about the underlying mechanisms of the general case. While I also consider both versions of the game, I prove uniqueness separately. One of the advantages of treating the general game directly is that, unlike FMP, I show there is not always need for a vanishing noise to get uniqueness.
We now discuss some of the related literature. Mason and Valentinyi [9] used a contraction mapping approach to establish uniqueness of equilibrium in a class of incomplete information games. Their argument requires sufficiently large perturbations from the complete information case and that players signals be sufficiently independent, or uninformative about others'. Their theory mainly imposes structure on beliefs. On the other hand, my paper studies global games, and so the uniqueness typically arises from very small perturbations from the complete information game. In global games, players' signals become fully informative and correlated as the noise level goes to zero. My uniqueness result instead imposes structure on payoffs. Finally, in a recent paper, Oury [18] extended the uniqueness result of FMP to multidimensional global games. It is an important step forward in global games, but her argument is a generalization of FMP's proof technique which is different from my contraction approach.
A Motivating Example
Consider this example taken from CvD. Two players are deciding whether to invest. Each player receives a net profit that depends not only on her action and her opponent's action, but also on a fundamental of the economy, denoted by θ ∈ IR. The payoff matrix is the following:
Notice that N I is strictly dominant for values of θ strictly below θ = 0, and I is strictly dominant for values of θ strictly above θ = 1. Further, there are two strict Nash equilibria when θ ∈ (0, 1). This is the multiple-equilibrium problem described earlier. Which one should be played?
We would like to have a paradigm to select one of these equilibria for each value of θ ∈ (0, 1). I show how introducing incomplete information solves the problem because the best-response is a contraction and hence gives uniqueness in the incomplete information version of the game. I shall then use CvD and FMP's techniques in this example to compare their approach to mine.
The incomplete information arises when payoffs are disturbed. State θ is drawn from a continuous distribution φ whose support is the real line. Each player observes a noisy signal s i = θ + ν i of the fundamental, where i is distributed according to some cdf
], and ν > 0. The information structure (φ, {F i }) allows each player i (through Bayes' rule) to construct a distribution function Ω i (s j |s i , ν), or simply Ω i (s i |s j ), representing her beliefs about j's signal upon receiving s i . Let us assume beliefs are translation increasing for all i which I define next. The cdf Ω i is translation increasing if for all s j and
and ∆ are such that ∆ * ≥ ∆. It means that i believes that j's signal is more likely to be below s j when receiving s i than it is below s j + ∆ when receiving s i + ∆ * . In the incomplete information game, it turns out that we only need to consider monotone strategies (See Section 3.3). So, a strategy for j is fully defined by a cutoff c j ∈ [0, 1]:
Denote by br i (c j ) that cutoff between actions N I and I that corresponds to i's bestresponse to c j . I shall prove that for any i ∈ N , br i is a contraction. That is,
then signal c i is such that:
In words, player i's expected payoff to playing 1 is bigger than her expected payoff to playing 0 if and only if the signal exceeds c i . Therefore, cutoff strategy br i (c j ) is the best-reply to c j .
From (1) , it is straightforward to show the contraction property using translation increasing beliefs. Take any ∆ > 0, c j ∈ [0, 1] and consider an increase from c j to c j + ∆. By means of contradiction, suppose
Notice that contraction of the joint best-response br = × i∈N br i follows immediately from the above. Take any c = (
). This definition of a contraction is not the usual one. Technically, br is a pseudo-contraction or a shrinking map.
To complete the proof of uniqueness, recall that global games are GSC and so by Tarski's fixed point theorem an equilibrium exists.
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The contraction property implies uniqueness.
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In the above example, translation increasing beliefs have a nice interpretation. Intuitively, it means that given two players i and j, player i believes player j is more likely to play her lower action whenever player i increases her strategy (lowers her cutoff) more than player j. By the complementarities, such a big increase cannot be optimal. Therefore, this property of the beliefs prevents strategies from getting carried away by the complementarities by tempering their effect.
The translation property drives the result but how restrictive is it? Many distributions are translation increasing like normal, double exponential distributions centered at s, and it is a common feature of location-scale families. We shall see that it is also satisfied whenever Ω i is derived from the combination of a uniform prior and any bounded noise function. Furthermore, Lemma 2 in Section 7 shows that even if we do not make this assumption, it holds in the limit as ν goes to zero. This Lemma demonstrates that for any prior the global game information structure naturally tends to be increasing in translation for small noise, which is why uniqueness is then reached in the limit only.
Equilibrium selection in the complete-information version of the game is obtained via uniqueness in its incomplete-information version. For all i, s i = θ + ν i and so s i gets closer to θ as ν becomes small because i ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]. Therefore, for a.e realization of the signals in the unique equilibrium, players play arbitrarily close to some Nash equilibrium of the complete information game as ν goes to zero. Now I turn to the alternative techniques that have been proposed so far and I use them to prove uniqueness in the investment game.
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Like FMP, suppose the prior is uniform and use iterated dominance. The largest strategy that rationally can be played by player j because of the dominance regions is c j = 0. In this case, br i (0) = l 1 ≥ 0. The least strategy that rationally can be played by player j is c j = 1, to which i best-responds by playing br i (1) = u 1 which is less than 1. Given the strategies that player j knows she can induce for player i, only her strategies with cutoff in U 2 ⊂ [l 1 , u 1 ] are not strictly dominated. We iterate on this logic ad infinitum. By Milgrom-Roberts [11] , iterated dominance leads to the existence of a 4 The contraction property alone does not ensure the existence of a fixed point without further information on its domain (See Remarks in Section 4.1.2). However, this existence problem is made vacuous by the fact that global games are GSC, and an equilibrium always exists in GSC.
5 Suppose the joint best-response br has at least two fixed points, c and c . Then by the contraction property:
6 What follows is the application of Section "Intuition for Limit Uniqueness" from FMP [4] .
largest and a least equilibrium in supermodular games: a * and a * . From there, FMP used a proof by contradiction which relies on a translation argument. By way of contradiction, say a I refer to this case as the linear signaling technology case. The noises are assumed to be conditionally independent of one another and of the state of the world: each i is independent of j for all j = i and of θ. Players then choose simultaneously an action in their action space and payoffs accrue according to π.
The Payoff Functions
Players are assumed to have a certain degree of exchangeability in their payoffs. They only care about an aggregate, g, of opponents' actions. Exchangeability still allows for a wide range of applications that remain convincing in a finite setting. Aggregate g will be specified in more detail later on. Let A −i be endowed with the product order.
, that is, dπ i is the difference in player i's utility to playing a i over a i when facing a −i at state θ. The assumptions on the payoff functions are the following.
Assumption 1 (A1) [Dominance Regions]
For extreme values of the payoff parameter θ, the extreme actions are strictly dominant: There exist θ and θ in IR with θ < θ, where [θ − ν, θ + ν] is contained in the interior of the support of φ, such that, for all i and for all
The payoff functions have increasing differences in (a i , a −i ): For all a i and a i in A i with
The payoff functions have strictly increasing differences in (a i , θ): For all a i and a i in [ 
Assumption 4 (A4)
We next discuss this set of assumptions. (A1)-(A3) and (A6) are common assumptions in the global game literature. FMP make the same assumptions. CvD only require (A1) and (A6). But CvD's result is limited to 2 × 2 games so (A2) is trivially satisfied when there are multiple equilibria, which is the case of interest in selection theory. Further, Morris and Shin [13] develop a model of currency attacks that satisfies (A1), (A2), (A6) and the weak version of (A3).
(A4) and (A5) are however not common in global games. (A4) imposes a monotonicity property on differences. The payoff functions exhibit strictly increasing differences in (a i , θ), but this increase in the payoff fades (increases) as g rises. Equivalently, this assumption asserts that the strategic complementarities decrease (increase) with the state, or with the signal when it enters players' payoff directly.
Proposition 1 shows it is easy to check whether a twice (or thrice) continuously differentiable function displays (A4).
Assumption (A5) says that for any pair of actions and any opposing profile, there is a state at which the player is indifferent between them. Note (A5) is redundant in 2-action games since it amounts to "set dominance regions." When there are more than two actions, (A5) rules out, for one, actions that are dominated for all θ. Moreover, requiring in (A5) that cutoffθ belong to [θ, θ] is not necessary because the existence of suchθ in IR would be sufficient for our purpose.
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The following proposition gives some insight into which class of payoff functions satisfy (A5).
Proposition 2 Let Co(A i ) be the convex hull of A i . Under (A1) and (A6), if for all
Finally, I wish to emphasize that the contraction result is, with some qualifications, as general as the previous results of uniqueness for 2 × 2 games, because (A4) and (A5) are not needed in this class of games. These assumptions become effective in general finite games, and even though the result becomes more restrictive, it captures interesting applications like currency crises and Diamond's search (See Section 6). In the currency crises model, (A5) will be trivial because there are only two actions, and (A4) will be a sensible property of the exchange rate. In the Diamond's search model, both assumptions will be satisfied in the traditional setting with convex cost functions.
The Beliefs
There are two categories of beliefs each player formulates upon receiving her signal: Those about the state of nature θ, and those about the signal of her opponents (s j ) j =i . I abuse notation and represent player i's beliefs about the signal of a subset J ⊂ N \{i} of her opponents by a distribution function Ω i (s J | s i , ν). Let st stand for the first-order stochastic dominance ordering.
I impose the following assumption on the beliefs. 
Unless otherwise specified, assumptions (A1)-(A7) are in effect all throughout this paper.
This condition is the only condition we need on beliefs. While it is not a condition directly on the primitives of the model, it is satisfied by many information structures. For instance, it is satisfied if the prior is uniform and the signaling technologies linear.
(A7) says that a player whose signal increases puts more weight on higher states. Although neither FMP nor CvD make such an assumption on beliefs, it must be satisfied in the limit. Given τ i and i is distributed on a bounded set, then as the error shrinks to zero, player i can restrict the potential values of θ to be in any neighborhood around s i . Therefore, if i's signal increases from s i to s i + x * with x * > 0, then there exists ν(x * ) > 0 such that i is certain that θ has also increased for all ν < ν(x * ). (A7) is then satisfied whenever s i > s i + x * . Therefore, (A7) tends to be satisfied for all s i and s i as ν goes to zero. Now that payoff functions and beliefs have been defined, I spell out the important distinction between private and common values. FMP show that there is continuity between these two versions of the game, and in their methodology, uniqueness in the first one provides sufficient grounds for uniqueness in the second one.
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A global game Γ(ν) has either private values or common values. In the private values world, the payoffs directly depend on the type s i . This is the case for the investment game in Section 2. The expected payoff for a player i who sees signal s i and is playing a i ∈ A i against opponents who play according to (a j (s j )) is given by:
In the common values world, the payoffs depend indirectly on the type s i . According to Bayes' rule and given her signal, a player infers the actual state θ she is in and she constructs beliefs about others' actions. If we denote by Ω i (s −i , θ|s i , ν) the joint conditional distribution of (s −i , θ) given s i at ν, the expected payoff for a player i who sees signal s i and is playing a i ∈ A i against opponents who play according to (a j (s j )) is given by:
Increasing Strategies
In this section, we show that under the above assumptions, it is enough to search for Nash equilibria in increasing strategies because Γ(ν) is a GSC and its extremal equilibria are increasing in the signal. We can then limit our investigation to the class of best-replies that are increasing in the signal.
For more general definitions of GSC, see for example Milgrom-Roberts [11] or Topkis [21] . The game Γ(ν) is the Bayesian version of a finite GSC, hence it is itself a GSC. By Tarski's theorem, the strategic complementarities yield a greatest and a least equilibria in GSC. Van Zandt and Vives (VZV hereafter) ( [24] , Theorem 1, p.11) prove that for Bayesian GSC these extremal equilibria are monotone in signal when signals are affiliated. In addition, the best-reply to any increasing strategy (in the signal) must be an increasing strategy. These two results are shown in Proposition 3 which applies both to the common and private values.
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As a result, if the contraction is established on the set of profiles in increasing strategies, then uniqueness will follow.
Proposition 3 Let br
i (ν)(a −i (.)) : IR → A i be i's best-response to a −i (.) in Γ(ν),
and assume (A2), (A3) and (A7). If
Remark: If the prior is uniform and we assume (A2) and (A3), then the claim of Proposition 3 holds because (A7) is trivially satisfied. Notice also that (A3) implies that the best-replies are almost everywhere functions of the signal, not correspondences. 4 The Main Result: Contraction of the Best-Reply I prove that, under my assumptions, the joint best-reply function in global games is a contraction. I then use this result to show uniqueness.
Definition 2 Let (X, d) be a metric space. If ξ satisfies the condition d(ξ(x), ξ(y)) < d(x, y)
for all x, y ∈ X with x = y, then ξ is called a pseudo-contraction (or shrinking map). 
Private Values Case
By Proposition 3, we can represent any strategy as a finite sequence of cutoff points. Those cutoff points are called fictitious cutoffs and a formal definition will be given subsequently. We will see that this concept is fundamentally different from the class of real cutoffs. From now on, let player i's strategy be (c
is the threshold below which i plays a i,k i and above which she plays a i,k i +1 . For notational purposes, we drop the superscript f and we denote these cutoff points by c i,k i , or simply c k i when there is no confusion.
Players only care about an aggregate of opponents' actions. I shall consider two different aggregates: sum and proportion. For all i ∈ N , aggregate sum is defined as follows. For all a −i ∈ A −i , Σ(a −i ) = j =i a j . Aggregate proportion synthesizes the proportion of opponents playing less than some action c. It is defined as follows:
For sum, the ordering is clear while proportion is endowed with st , that is, the higher with respect to >, the smaller.
As players focus on aggregates that summarize their opponents' play, they only formulate beliefs about what g could be. I abuse notation slightly and refer sometimes to g as an element of H. Let Λ i (g|c −i , s i , ν) be i's beliefs that the aggregate is strictly less than g when she receives signal s i given her opponents play according to c −i ∈ C −i . Notice Λ i is increasing in s i with respect to st . To see why, recall that j is independent of s i and τ j is strictly increasing in θ for all j = i. Therefore, (A7) implies that player i expects her opponents receive higher signals after hers rises. Since strategies in C −i are increasing in signals and g is increasing in strategies, we reach the conclusion.
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This paper focuses on the study of those particular aggregates, Σ and ∆, only because they cover a wide range of applications in global games. The theory developed in this section applies to all aggregates g which, like Σ and ∆, are increasing in actions and non-constant.
Intuition for the Contraction Result
This section extends the logic of Section 2 and shows the basic intuition behind the whole approach taken in this paper. The point is to extract the general pattern behind Equation 1. Let Γ(ν) be a global game in private values with N = {1, 2} and A i = A = {0, 1} for i = 1, 2. Let A be endowed with the natural order. Let us assume (A1) through (A7). Consider player j has a cutoff strategy, say c j ∈ [θ, θ]. Observe that when player i receives signal s i ∈ IR and plays a ∈ A, her expected payoff is given by:
Since strategies are increasing, player i best-responds to c j when her cutoff is the signal s i such that: Eπ(0, s i ) = Eπ i (1, s i ). This particular signal will be denoted c i . If we let
Dropping the subscript i,
. Graphically, we can represent (4) in the following picture
(A2) implies δ is positive. In addition, both sides of (4) are continuous in s i from (A6) and continuity of Λ i in s i 13 which makes sure the intersection occurs. This unique intersection in the graph determines the value of Ω i at c i .
To establish the contraction property, take any distinct c j , c j ∈ [θ, θ] and consider the best-replies c i ≡ br i (c j ) and c i ≡ br i (c j ). Assume (DSM ) and translation increasing beliefs. By way of contradiction, suppose
, then δV = r by (4), but (DSM ) and the assumption on beliefs imply δ V ≤ δV . By (A3), r > r. So, put together: δ V ≤ δV = r < r . This is a contradiction because it violates δ V = r , the optimality condition (4) for c i . Therefore, c i − c i < |c j − c j |. Using a similar argument or the monotonicity of br i , we
The contradiction is also clear in the graph: Since r > r, the intersection must now occur at a (strictly) higher value of Ω which, by the translation property, is only possible
Translation increasing beliefs are crucial, but note also the role of (DSM ). We know δ i (s i ) is positive by supermodularity which gives players an incentive to respond increasingly when their opponents' actions go up. Nonetheless, this payoff incentive is assumed to die down with the state and so players do not overreact.
Under (ISM ), we also reach a contradiction, which shows the overwhelming effect of translation increasing beliefs. But, it is less visible in a graph than before. Indeed, it becomes a matter of which side of (4) rises more. I opted for the more transparent argument here. Further, when beliefs are not translation increasing for every ν as they were previously, they (uniformly) tend to be as ν → 0.
14 This gives rise to several issues that are addressed in Section 7. But the intuition stays the same. The second source of problems is in the extension to many actions. Section 5 deals with this issue and it is treated formally in Section 7.
Main Results

The Contraction
Here, I generalize the argument just given, but I defer the proofs to Section 7. First, I define formally the concept of real cutoff. (a i,β , a i,α , g(a −i (.) ), c r β,α ) = 0.
Definition 3
The real cutoff between two actions is the only signal at which a player is indifferent between them. Below this signal, the player strictly prefers the smaller one, and above she strictly prefers the bigger one.
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But many of these pairwise comparisons are invisible when observing the resulting (increasing) best-response. This gives birth to the fictitious cutoffs that only select those pairwise comparisons that matter to represent the best-reply. I will come back to this issue in some detail in Section 5.
The Secondly, I formally define translation increasing beliefs.
Definition 4 For player
Beliefs are translation increasing if, whenever i's signal increases more than all the opposing cutoffs, then beliefs increase with respect to st . It plays a very important role in global games as it prevents strategies from getting carried away by the complementarities. When player i increases her strategy more than her opponents, it keeps her from believing that higher values of the aggregate are more likely which moderates her increase. If she put more weight on higher values of g, then strategic complementarities would make such an increase optimal.
In addition, this translation property is quite natural because translating the full set of opponents' cutoffs to the right (left) by x should not change the beliefs on average, much less for small ν, if the signal was raised (lowered) by x. Then, the definition would follow by first-order stochastic dominance. Notice this characteristic is verified by many distributions with bounded support such as doubly-truncated normals, double exponentials, or some betas centered at s i
16
and it is a common feature of location-scale families. The next two results are both contraction results. Recall that C −i is the set of opposing profiles to player i that are in increasing strategies, and so every profile in this set is Proposition 4 says that every single real cutoff is a contraction of the opposing profile. But this cannot be applied directly to show that the best-response is also a shrinking map. Indeed, we said we could represent any strategy with m i − 1 cutoff points and yet there are many more real cutoffs. Consequently, a lot of them are vacuous and a selection is performed which leads to Theorem 1. I defer the discussion of this issue to the next section.
Theorem 1 Let br(ν) : C → C be the joint best-response function. If for any
Proof: See Section 7.
Uniqueness of equilibrium is an important corollary of Theorem 1. We know there exist a greatest and a least equilibrium in Γ(ν) because it is a GSC. However, they cannot be different by the contraction property. FMP's uniqueness result in private values becomes then a consequence of this corollary since uniform prior and linear signaling technologies imply translation increasing beliefs by Corollary 5 of Section 7. 
Corollary 1 (FMP [4]) If the prior is uniform and the signaling technologies are linear, Γ(ν) has an essentially unique Nash equilibrium for every ν > 0.
The seminal work in global games by CvD dealt with 2×2 games. In this context, (A4) is dispensable and (A5) is trivially satisfied which leads to Proposition 5. The proposition states that the joint best-response in 2 × 2 games is contractive, and so there is a unique equilibrium in 2 × 2 global games (possibly in the limit) because the joint best-reply is a contraction. This result is established under the traditional assumptions.
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Note it is a private values environment, but it is sufficient for uniqueness in the limit (See [4] ).
17 Proposition 5 also uses translation increasing beliefs, but as we will see later, beliefs may not satisfy this condition. Nevertheless, there is an analog result of this proposition without the translation hypothesis, along the lines of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2: Under the traditional assumptions, the best-reply in 2 × 2 global games is a contraction in the limit.
Proposition 5 Let Γ(ν) be a 2 × 2 global game. Under (A1)-(A3) and (A6), if for any i ∈ {1, 2}, beliefs Ω(c j |s i , ν) are translation increasing for each ν, then br(ν) is a pseudo-contraction and so an essentially unique equilibrium exists.
The proof is omitted but the argument is simple, 18 so I outline it here. In Section 4.1.1, note r i (s i ) = δ i (s i ) + dπ i (1, 0, 0, s i ) . Hence, r i always increases more than δ i by (A3). By translation increasing beliefs, the right-hand side of (4) always increases more than the left-hand side whenever c i ≥ c i + |c j − c j |. This is a contradiction.
Remarks.
1. Note that the uniqueness result is also supported by Edelstein's fixed point Theorem 19 as soon as compactness of C has been proved. This can be seen by induction since C = i∈N Grϕ
. Clearly, ϕ is closed-valued with compact range and is continuous. As a result Grϕ is closed by the Closed Graph Theorem and trivially, it is bounded. Now, suppose that ϕ k−1 has compact graph. Then, ϕ k has compact range as it is continuous. Clearly, ϕ k is closed-valued and so its graph is compact. Therefore, Grϕ
is compact for all i ∈ N . Then C is compact.
2. Technically, real cutoffs are a well-defined concept. Beliefs Ω i ((a j < s j < b j ) j =i |s i , ν) are continuous in the signal for a < b in IR n−1 .
20
The finiteness of A i implies that for any g ∈ H, there are finitely many combinations of opposing profiles that can lead to g. Therefore, Λ i (g|c −i , s i , ν) is a finite sum of probabilities of the form Ω i ((a j < s j < b j ) j =i |s i , ν) so that Λ i is continuous as well. Consequently, (A5), (A6), continuity and |A −i | < ∞ ensure that there always exists a real cutoff point in [θ, θ] between two actions whatever the opponents do. The real cutoffs are thus a well-defined concept in Γ(ν).
Although translation increasingness seems like a reasonable requirement, it might be that some information structures do not generate such well-behaved beliefs. In the case of linear signaling technologies, Lemma 1 in Section 7 tells us that this property is satisfied in the limit. In other words, the information structure underlying global games automatically produces translation increasing beliefs as ν goes to zero. As a result, the best-reply tends to shrink on the whole set of increasing strategies, and every point that falls into the contraction domain at some ν also brings in a neighborhood. This is Theorem 2. 18 See Mathevet [10] for the complete proof. 19 Let (C, d) be a compact metric space. If ξ is a pseudo-contraction on C with respect to d, then ξ has a unique fixed-point. 20 See Footnote 13. 21 Notice that if ν < ν then C ν ⊂ C ν .
Theorem 2 The contraction domain approaches the whole space, that is,
with c = c , there exist a neighborhood U of (c, c ) and
This result has uniqueness in the limit as a corollary. The greatest and the smallest equilibrium must converge towards each other as ν goes small.
Corollary 2
Let e ν and e ν be respectively the largest and least equilibrium in Γ(ν). Then, d(e ν , e ν ) → 0 as ν → 0 and so there is an essentially unique equilibrium in the limit.
Convergence of Equilibria
We have learned that under translation increasing beliefs, Γ(ν) only has an essentially unique equilibrium. A natural question is to ask whether this sequence of Nash equilibria converges to some profile as ν goes to zero. The answer is affirmative given an additional assumption of monotonicity on beliefs.
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This is proved in Mathevet [10] . The proof exploits the smoothness of contractive maps and what I call eventually monotone convergence. For what we are concerned with in this paper, FMP [4] proved that the sequence of unique equilibria arising from uniform prior and linear signaling technologies converges to a limit.
Common Values Case
Here players' signals no longer enter their expected payoff directly. I assume signaling technologies are linear. Moreover, the analysis is done under strict first-order stochastic dominance of the beliefs.
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This is not more restrictive than (A7) if we assume that for each (s i , ν), (.|s i , ν) . From (A7), we obtain st by st and the non-equality due to the strictly increasing support. For example, Ψ i always has full support when signals are linear and the prior is uniform, since f i has full support by assumption.
Recall that i's beliefs about (s −i , θ) are given by the joint conditional distribution
22 Like (A7), this monotonicity assumption naturally tends to be satisfied in the limit. 23 This strengthens (A7) to st where for any distributions F and G,
and it is a finite sum of probabilities of the form Ω i ((a j < s j < b j ) j =i , θ| s i , ν). From now on, ν is supposed to be less than η/e * where η > 0. This condition results in no loss of generality since we are interested in uniqueness for ν small enough. Nevertheless, it ensures that all the real cutoffs are well-defined. I discuss this condition later as a Remark. Finally, we strengthen all the assumptions from (A1) to (A7) by replacing the existing θ (θ) with θ − η (θ + η). Now, I define the analog of translation increasing beliefs for the common values.
Definition 7 For player i ∈ N , beliefs Λ i (g, θ| c −i , s i , ν) are said to be increasing in translation (with respect to st ) if for all c
Definition 7 says that whenever player i's signal increases more than does every dimension of the opposing cutoff vector, then her beliefs about the aggregate and the state increase with respect to st . Interpreted differently, when player i increases her strategy more than her opponent, she thinks that greater aggregative values and higher states are less likely. As actions are strategic complements with one another and with the state, this statistical characteristic plays a moderating role so that strategies are not carried away. Proposition 6 and Lemma 3 in Section 7 show that the information structure of global games implies this form of translation increasing beliefs when the prior is uniform or in the limit (as ν goes to zero) with a general prior.
The next theorem applies when beliefs are increasing in translation. In this context, there is ν small enough so that the joint best-response function is a pseudo-contraction. Unlike Theorem 4, we know that a unique equilibrium is actually reached for each ν < η/e * ; there is no need for a vanishing noise to get uniqueness. This result is noteworthy because the translation assumption is sensible and it is often verified, for instance when the prior is uniform.
Theorem 3 Let br(ν) : C → C be the joint best-response function. If for any
i ∈ N , beliefs Λ i (Σ, θ|c −i , s i , ν) (or Λ i (∆, θ|c −i , s i , ν)) are increasing in translation, then for every ν < η/e * ,
br(ν) is a pseudo-contraction and an essentially unique equilibrium exists.
The fundamental result in common values is the next theorem which leads to a unique equilibrium in the limit. 24 This is the probability that the aggregate is strictly less than g and the state less than θ. 
Theorem 4 The contraction domain approaches the whole space, that is,
Corollary 3 (FMP [4] ) Let e ν and e ν be respectively the largest and least equilibrium in Γ(ν). Then, d(e ν , e ν ) → 0 as ν → 0 and so there is an essentially unique equilibrium in the limit.
Remarks.
1. FMP proved that as the signal noise shrinks, the sequence of largest equilibria and the sequence of smallest equilibria in common values converge to the unique outcome of Γ(ν) under private values and uniform prior.
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In this last case, the sequence of unique equilibrium converges to a limit, hence all three sequences have the same limit which is the well-known uniqueness prediction of global games.
2. If strict first-order stochastic dominance of Ψ i is weakened to (A7) then best-replies may not be functions. Since global games are GSC, there exists a greatest and a least best-response that are monotone in the signal. It is then possible to show that the contraction domain of those extremal selections approaches the whole space as ν → 0 (See Definition 6 and Theorem 4). Therefore, the best-response correspondence is a pseudo-contraction correspondence in the limit.
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Uniqueness is reached because those extremal selections become arbitrarily close as ν → 0, but they also tend to have a unique fixed point in the limit (See Corollary 3). 
On the Fictitious Cutoff Points
The fictitious cutoffs are the threshold signals that separate an action from its successor, and they are sufficient to represent any increasing (simple) function. Since we only need m i − 1 cutoffs to represent i's strategy and we have many more available real cutoffs, we need a way of excluding the dispensable ones. The selection will warrant the separation between Proposition 4 and Theorem 1. Let us start with an example. Therefore, the fictitious cutoff points take on values of real cutoffs, but they might switch real cutoffs from one opposing profile to the other, which makes it harder to identify any contraction. If each fictitious cutoff was attached to the same real cutoff all the way through, then contraction would follow immediately from Proposition 4. The next definition is actually the formal derivation of the fictitious cutoff points from a set of real cutoffs. Once I have laid out the definition, I explain the intuition behind Theorem 1 by working through the above example. 
This defines a map from the real cutoff points to the fictitious cutoffs. For any vector of real cutoffs, there corresponds a unique vector of fictitious cutoffs. Implicitly, we defined the fictitious cutoffs in the context of best-responses only, as they emerge from the real cutoff points. Now I set out the intuition for the contraction in the context of the example. I only < d(c j , c j ) . This argument implies that the map that carries real cutoffs to fictitious cutoffs is continuous in (C, d) . The fictitious cutoffs are proved to contract by showing that they weakly contract as a function of the real cutoffs, which themselves contract as a function of the opponents' strategy.
Examples
Currency Crises
This is a version of the model by Morris and Shin [13] . Here, a finite number n of speculators decide whether to attack a fixed-exchange regime by selling short one unit of the currency. The current value of the currency is r * . The economy is characterized by a state of fundamentals θ which is distributed according to φ on a convex subset of IR. The currency will float to the shadow rate ζ if there is no intervention from the monetary authority. The cost of attacking the currency c(θ) is strictly increasing in θ, reflecting the fact that stronger fundamentals make an attack costlier. Writing 1 for the action "not attack" and 0 for the action "attack," let ∆ = ( j =i 1 a j <1 )/(n − 1) for each i ∈ N . The monetary authority defends the currency if this intervention is not too costly. Therefore, the cost of defending the currency is assumed to be increasing in the proportion of speculators who attack, ∆, and decreasing in the state of the fundamentals. There is a minimal proportion of speculators who must attack, a(θ), for a devaluation to occur.
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The payoffs are given by: 
Finally, the shadow exchange rate is increasing with ∆ for each θ, 30 27 Here, I assume implicitly that both a(θ) and n make it unnecessary to know whether or not i herself attacks. In other words, given ∆, a player cannot alone spark or prevent the devaluation. For example, assume a(IR) ⊂ (−∞, 0) ∪ (1/n, (n − 1)/n) ∪ (1, ∞) . 28 Note that this condition allows for some discontinuities of a when ζ and c are continuous. 29 Suppose M is big enough so the model is interesting for a large range of θ. 30 This means that ζ(θ, ∆ ) − ζ(θ, ∆ ) ≥ 0, whenever ∆ st ∆ or equivalently ∆ > ∆ .
and for any ∆ > ∆ , ζ(θ, ∆ ) − ζ(θ, ∆ ) is decreasing in θ which accounts for the larger resistance of the exchange rate to changes in ∆ when fundamentals are stronger.
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This is a model where a devaluation does not always benefit the speculators. There exists an interval after a(θ) where the devaluation is not substantial enough to be profitable. Even if attacking results in a devaluation, it is only optimal after ∆ has passed some threshold a(θ) + (1), each of them has a dominant strategy not to attack. In addition, there is an interval in (a
(1)) where the two symmetric profiles are both equilibria. There are only two actions so that (A5) is automatically satisfied, and (DSM ) also holds.
Diamond's Search Model
This is a version of the Diamond-type search model of Milgrom and Roberts [11] . There are a finite number of players {1, . . . , n} who exert effort a i ∈ A i ≡ {0, . . . , a} searching for trading partners. The probability of any trader to find a partner is proportional to her own effort and the sum of the efforts of the others denoted Σ −i . The economy is characterized by a state of the fundamentals θ which is distributed according to φ on a convex subset of IR, and each player receives a private signal about θ with the properties described earlier. The positive cost to individual i for exerting a level of search a i is c i (a i , θ) and so her payoff is defined by:
where α > 0. Since ∂ 2 π i /∂a i ∂Σ = α for i = j, this is a supermodular game in (a i , Σ) and so (A2) is satisfied. For simplicity, cost function c i is assumed to be continuous in θ which verifies (A6), and it is C 2 on Co(A i ) for each θ. Moreover, c i has strictly decreasing differences in (a i , θ), and in particular, there exist θ and θ with θ < θ such that for all a i ∈ A i , c i (a i , θ) > α(n − 1)(a + ε) for some ε > 0 and all θ < θ, and c i (a i , θ) < 0 for all θ > θ. For example, costs may be decreasing when learning is taken into account. The state of the world θ could summarize knowledge in the economy and as θ increases the marginal cost strictly decreases which accounts for (A3). In particular, there exists a state θ from which learning (by doing) is so high that each unit produced decreases the cost. As a result, (A1) holds and since c i is traditionally convex in a i , then by Proposition 2, (A5) is satisfied. Finally, Proposition 1 establishes (A4). The theory of Section 4 then applies. Consider the symmetric version of the game. Notice that there existsθ > θ such that c(., θ) is strictly increasing in a i for all θ ∈ (θ,θ) because A i is finite, c (a i , θ) > α(n − 1)(a + ε) and c is continuous. Therefore, a i = 0 for all i is an equilibrium. Since c is smooth and convex, if A i is rich enough, then there is also a symmetric equilibrium where effort levels across players are the same. This equilibrium is derived from the optimality condition in the case where
, θ). Consequently, there is an interval in (θ,θ) for which there are multiple equilibria.
Proofs
Without further notice, the proofs are given assuming (DSM ). Most of the proofs under (ISM ) can be found in Mathevet [10] . 
which can be rewritten,
Now, pick β, α ∈ {1, . . . , m i } such that β > α. For any Σ, Σ in H and signal s i , let
By definition, c r β,α is the signal s i that verifies Edπ i (a i,α , a i,β , c −i , s i ) = 0 which by (7) is equivalent to the signal s i such that
Denote by l(c −i , s i ) and r(s i ) respectively the left-hand side and right-hand side in (8) . 
Case 1: Action a k i is played both under br i (c −i ) and br i (c −i ). Notice this is similar to the case of the greatest fictitious cutoff and so the proof is analogous.
by induction hypothesis and c k i −1 − c k i ≤ 0 since the best-response is increasing in the signal. Therefore, 
Put Cases 3a and 4a (3b and 4b) together to obtain: 
The next Lemma draws its main idea and technicalities from Lemma 4 in FMP [4] . Lemma 1 says that beliefs Ω i tend to be translation invariant in the limit and this is achieved uniformly in ν for all parameters. Denote
, 
Then, ε x * (ν) → 0 and, The claim is proved.
Q.E.D
The next Lemma shows that beliefs about the aggregate tend to be translation increasing in the limit and this is achieved uniformly in ν for all parameters. In the proof, notice that I only make use of the monotonicity of Σ and the proof would go similarly with any increasing g. As in the proof of Lemma 1, the claim holds for the greatest proportion. The rest of the proof then goes similarly.
As x * is continuous in (c, c ), then for any i ∈ N there exists a neighborhood of (c −i , c −i ) such that (21) is satisfied at ν i . Therefore, there is a neighborhood U of (c, c ) and ν > 0 such that U ⊂ C ν .
Proof of Corollary 2: Suppose by way of contradiction that there is ι > 0 such that for all ν > 0, there exists ν < ν for which d(e ν , e ν ) > ι. Since {(e ν , e ν )} ⊂ C 2 and C 2 is compact, then the sequence has at least one cluster point in C 2 . For such ι to exist, there must be a cluster point of the sequence, denoted (e, e), such that e = e. By Theorem 2, there exists ν such that a neighborhood U of (e, e) is a subset of C ν . Now, take two disjoint neighborhoods U and U in C, respectively of e and e, such that U × U ⊂ U. Notice such neighborhoods exist because U is an open set in the product topology. Since (e, e) is a cluster point, then there exists ν < ν such that (e ν , e ν ) ∈ U × U ⊂ U ⊂ C ν which is a contradiction. 
